What happens if there is an error while creating the new contract / burning the old one? Can that process be secure enough so that materially valuable assets be entrusted to use that process?
Very interesting, looking forward to seeing the details when the deep dive appears.
What is the reason for recursively launching a new contract? Is it not possible to achieve the desired effect by keeping track of durations for tidemark auctions, time between auctions, etc.?
With automatically entering NFTs into auctions, I wonder if this might be annoying for NFT owners who know they want to hold an NFT indefinitely. Perhaps there should be a way to automatically pay the fee? Or pay it should it be below as certain level (to avoid paying extraordinary amounts). Basically, a sort of backstop to avoid losing an NFT you desire to keep (maybe you are unexpectedly unavaillable around the time of the auction).
Decided to go ahead and deploy something. Many aspects of it are half-finished but progress was slow enough I figured I better deploy pronto or risk never sharing anything (kept getting hung up on frontend things; and irl demands intensifying).
Minting period lasts approx. 4-5 more days (free+gas to mint), then the cycles start: 1) interim stage (things work like normal NFTs), 2) bidding period for the tidemark auction, 3) grace period when current owner can pay royalties if necessary -- all 1 day each, then repeats.
Open for anyone to try it out but be aware bugs likely, try at own risk, recommend burner MetaMask even though it's testnet.
Finally, no worries if you're too busy to try it out / engage much -- I'm swamped myself these days so totally understand. Just wanted to get the thing out.
Finding it challenging to model the moving parts here, so just going to think out loud a bit about some scenarios to check if I'm understanding correctly.
Suppose Alice owns an NFT that she purchased at auction or minted for 10 XTZ. Between tidemark auctions, she can still sell to Bob at, say, 2000 XTZ. This is an "under the table" sale and no royalties are paid. However, presumably Bob feels (or felt) the NFT is worth 2000 XTZ or so. When it's time for the next tidemark auction (which can't verify the authenticity of this 2000 XTZ sale), if the winning bid is 50 XTZ Bob will certainly want to pay royalties on that price and retain ownership. If the market roughly agrees with Bob about the value, say with a winning bid of 1800-2200 XTZ, then Bob will have a somewhat tougher decision to make about whether to pay royalties and retain ownership.
Similarly, if Alice's 2000 XTZ sale to "Bob" had been a wash trade, this might partially be evident in a disparity between the price for that sale and the price people are willing to pay in the auction with royalties. If Alice had tried to execute that wash trade on-record in the tidemark auction, it would at least be more costly due to the royalties.
What happens if there is an error while creating the new contract / burning the old one? Can that process be secure enough so that materially valuable assets be entrusted to use that process?
The tweet here https://twitter.com/ArthurB/status/1659972821794136064?cxt=HHwWgIC9vZGftIkuAAAA from Arthur got me wondering whether this recursive royalty proposal interacts with account abstraction; I've no particular insight to offer on it, but wanted to flag this as possibly something to look into.
Very interesting, looking forward to seeing the details when the deep dive appears.
What is the reason for recursively launching a new contract? Is it not possible to achieve the desired effect by keeping track of durations for tidemark auctions, time between auctions, etc.?
With automatically entering NFTs into auctions, I wonder if this might be annoying for NFT owners who know they want to hold an NFT indefinitely. Perhaps there should be a way to automatically pay the fee? Or pay it should it be below as certain level (to avoid paying extraordinary amounts). Basically, a sort of backstop to avoid losing an NFT you desire to keep (maybe you are unexpectedly unavaillable around the time of the auction).
Decided to go ahead and deploy something. Many aspects of it are half-finished but progress was slow enough I figured I better deploy pronto or risk never sharing anything (kept getting hung up on frontend things; and irl demands intensifying).
So here it is, frontend live at https://3d6nft.com, code for UI at https://gitlab.com/jooxe3ri/3d6-nft-ui.
Contract is on Ethereum's Goerli testnet here
https://goerli.etherscan.io/address/0x929d9fd46953aff3e30fd86baf88d8e4572d0e0e.
Contract code at https://gitlab.com/jooxe3ri/tidemark-nft-contracts.
Minting period lasts approx. 4-5 more days (free+gas to mint), then the cycles start: 1) interim stage (things work like normal NFTs), 2) bidding period for the tidemark auction, 3) grace period when current owner can pay royalties if necessary -- all 1 day each, then repeats.
Open for anyone to try it out but be aware bugs likely, try at own risk, recommend burner MetaMask even though it's testnet.
Finally, no worries if you're too busy to try it out / engage much -- I'm swamped myself these days so totally understand. Just wanted to get the thing out.
Finding it challenging to model the moving parts here, so just going to think out loud a bit about some scenarios to check if I'm understanding correctly.
Suppose Alice owns an NFT that she purchased at auction or minted for 10 XTZ. Between tidemark auctions, she can still sell to Bob at, say, 2000 XTZ. This is an "under the table" sale and no royalties are paid. However, presumably Bob feels (or felt) the NFT is worth 2000 XTZ or so. When it's time for the next tidemark auction (which can't verify the authenticity of this 2000 XTZ sale), if the winning bid is 50 XTZ Bob will certainly want to pay royalties on that price and retain ownership. If the market roughly agrees with Bob about the value, say with a winning bid of 1800-2200 XTZ, then Bob will have a somewhat tougher decision to make about whether to pay royalties and retain ownership.
Similarly, if Alice's 2000 XTZ sale to "Bob" had been a wash trade, this might partially be evident in a disparity between the price for that sale and the price people are willing to pay in the auction with royalties. If Alice had tried to execute that wash trade on-record in the tidemark auction, it would at least be more costly due to the royalties.